external constraint

1) Military: external communication

2) Engineering: XCOM external communications, external constraint

3) Information technology: external linkage (между идентификаторами)

* * *

m 1. < Comp> compression, printing; 2. < Geschäft> pressure; 3. < Medien> print, printing; 4. < Pol> leverage; 5. < Transp> compression; 6. <V&M> letterpress; 7. <Vw> Preisdruck, Kursdruck downward pressure ■ auf jmdn. Druck ausüben < Geschäft> bring pressure to bear on sb, put pressure on sb ■ in Druck gehen < Medien> go to press, go to the printers ■ unter Druck geraten < Geschäft> come under pressure ■ unter Druck handeln < Geschäft> act under pressure ■ unter Druck setzen <Person, Vw> put pressure on, pressurize, Preise squeeze, put pressure on sb

* * *

νόμος, ου, ὁ (νέμω; [Zenodotus reads ν. in Od. 1, 3] Hes.+; loanw. in rabb.—On the history of the word MPohlenz, Nomos: Philol 97, ’48, 135–42; GShipp, Nomos ‘Law’ ’78; MOstwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of Athenian Democracy ’69). The primary mng. relates to that which is conceived as standard or generally recognized rules of civilized conduct esp. as sanctioned by tradition (Pind., Fgm. 152, 1=169 Schr. νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς; cp. SEG XVII, 755, 16: Domitian is concerned about oppressive practices hardening into ‘custom’; MGigante, ΝΟΜΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ [Richerche filologiche 1] ’56). The synonym ἔθος (cp. συνήθεια) denotes that which is habitual or customary, especially in reference to personal behavior. In addition to rules that take hold through tradition, the state or other legislating body may enact ordinances that are recognized by all concerned and in turn become legal tradition. A special semantic problem for modern readers encountering the term ν. is the general tendency to confine the usage of the term ‘law’ to codified statutes. Such limitation has led to much fruitless debate in the history of NT interpretation.—HRemus, Sciences Religieuses/Studies in Religion 13, ’84, 5–18; ASegal, Torah and Nomos in Recent Scholarly Discussion, ibid., 19–27.

① a procedure or practice that has taken hold, a custom, rule, principle, norm (Alcman [VII B.C.], Fgm. 93 D² of the tune that the bird sings; Ocellus [II B.C.] c. 49 Harder [1926] τῆς φύσεως νόμος; Appian, Basil. 1 §2 πολέμου ν., Bell. Civ. 5, 44 §186 ἐκ τοῦδε τοῦ σοῦ νόμου=under this rule of yours that governs action; Polyaenus 5, 5, 3 ν. πόμπης; 7, 11, 6 ν. φιλίας; Sextus 123 τοῦ βίου νόμος; Just., A II, 2, 4 παρὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως ν.; Ath. 3, 1 νόμῳ φύσεως; 13, 1 θυσιῶν νόμῳ)

ⓐ gener. κατὰ νόμον ἐντολῆς σαρκίνης in accordance w. the rule of an external commandment Hb 7:16. εὑρίσκω τὸν νόμον I observe an established procedure or principle or system Ro 7:21 (ν. as ‘principle’, i.e. an unwritten rightness of things Soph., Ant. 908). According to Bauer, Paul uses the expression νόμος (which dominates this context) in cases in which he prob. would have preferred another word. But it is also prob. that Paul purposely engages in wordplay to heighten the predicament of those who do not rely on the gospel of liberation from legal constraint: the Apostle speaks of a principle that obligates one to observe a code of conduct that any sensible pers. would recognize as sound and valid ὁ νόμος τ. νοός μου vs. 23b (s. νοῦς 1a). Engaged in a bitter struggle w. this νόμος there is a ἕτερος νόμος which, in contrast to the νοῦς, dwells ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου in my (physical) members vs. 23a, and hence is a νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας vs. 23c and 25b or a νόμος τ. ἁμαρτίας καὶ τ. θανάτου 8:2b. This sense prepares the way for the specific perspective

ⓑ of life under the lordship of Jesus Christ as a ‘new law’ or ‘system’ of conduct that constitutes an unwritten tradition ὁ καινὸς ν. τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ 2:6; in brief ν. Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ IMg 2 (cp. Just., D. 11, 4; 43, 1; Mel., P. 7, 46). Beginnings of this terminology as early as Paul: ὁ ν. τοῦ Χριστοῦ =the standard set by Christ Gal 6:2 (as vs. 3 intimates, Christ permitted himself to be reduced to nothing, thereby setting the standard for not thinking oneself to be someth.). The gospel is a νόμος πίστεως a law or system requiring faith Ro 3:27b (FGerhard, TZ 10, ’54, 401–17) or ὁ ν. τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χρ. Ἰ. the law of the spirit (=the spirit-code) of life in Chr. J. 8:2a. In the same sense Js speaks of a ν. βασιλικός (s. βασιλικός) 2:8 or ν. ἐλευθερίας vs. 12 (λόγος ἐλ. P⁷⁴), ν. τέλειος ὁ τῆς ἐλευθερίας 1:25 (association w. 1QS 10:6, 8, 11 made by EStauffer, TLZ 77, ’52, 527–32, is rejected by SNötscher, Biblica 34, ’53, 193f. On the theme of spontaneous moral achievement cp. Pind., Fgm. 152 [169 Schr.] 1f νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς | θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων | ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον| ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί=custom is lord of all, of mortals and immortals both, and with strong hand directs the utmost power of the just. Plut., Mor. 780c interprets Pindar’s use of νόμος: ‘not written externally in books or on some wooden tablets, but as lively reason functioning within him’ ἔμψυχος ὢν ἐν αὐτῷ λόγῳ; Aristot., EN 4, 8, 10 οἷον ν. ὢν ἑαυτῷ; Diod S 1, 94, 1 ν. ἔγγραπτος; cp. also Ovid, Met. 1, 90 sponte sua sine lege fidem rectumque colebat; Mayor, comm. ‘Notes’ 73.—RHirzel, ΑΓΡΑΦΟΣ ΝΟΜΟΣ 1903.). Some would put ὁ νόμος Js 2:9 here (s. LAllevi, Scuola Cattol. 67, ’39, 529–42), but s. 2b below.—Hermas too, who in part interprets Israel’s legal tradition as referring to Christians, sees the gospel, exhibited in Christ’s life and words, as the ultimate expression of God’s will or ‘law’. He says of Christ δοὺς αὐτοῖς (i.e. the believers) τὸν ν., ὅν ἔλαβε παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ Hs 5, 6, 3, cp. Hs 8, 3, 3. Or he sees in the υἱὸς θεοῦ κηρυχθεὶς εἰς τὰ πέρατα τῆς γῆς, i.e. the preaching about the Son of God to the ends of the earth, the νόμος θεοῦ ὁ δοθεὶς εἰς ὅλον. τ. κόσμον 8, 3, 2. Similarly to be understood are τηρεῖν τὸν ν. 8, 3, 4. ὑπὲρ τοῦ ν. παθεῖν 8, 3, 6. ὑπὲρ τοῦ ν. θλίβεσθαι 8, 3, 7. ἀρνησάμενοι τὸν νόμον ibid. βλασφημεῖν τὸν ν. 8, 6, 2.

② constitutional or statutory legal system, law

ⓐ gener.: by what kind of law? Ro 3:27. ν. τῆς πόλεως the law of the city enforced by the ruler of the city (ν. ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γραπτός Orig., C. Cels. 5, 37, 2); the penalty for breaking it is banishment Hs 1:5f. τοῖς ν. χρῆσθαι observe the laws 1:3; πείθεσθαι τοῖς ὡρισμένοις ν. obey the established laws Dg 5:10; νικᾶν τοὺς ν. ibid. (νικάω 3). Ro 7:1f, as well as the gnomic saying Ro 4:15b and 5:13b, have been thought by some (e.g. BWeiss, Jülicher) to refer to Roman law, but more likely the Mosaic law is meant (s. 3 below).

ⓑ specifically: of the law that Moses received from God and is the standard according to which membership in the people of Israel is determined (Diod S 1, 94, 1; 2: the lawgiver Mneves receives the law from Hermes, Minos from Zeus, Lycurgus from Apollo, Zarathustra from the ἀγαθὸς δαίμων, Zalmoxis from Hestia; παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις, Μωϋσῆς receives the law from the Ἰαὼ ἐπικαλούμενος θεός) ὁ ν. Μωϋσέως Lk 2:22; J 7:23; Ac 15:5. ν. Μωϋσέως Ac 13:38; Hb 10:28. Also ὁ ν. κυρίου Lk 2:23f, 39; GJs 14:1. ὁ ν. τοῦ θεοῦ (Theoph. Ant. 2, 14 [p. 136, 4]) Mt 15:6 v.l.; Ro 8:7 (cp. Tat. 7, 2; 32, 1; Ath. 3:2). ὁ ν. ἡμῶν, ὑμῶν, αὐτῶν etc. J 18:31; 19:7b v.l.; Ac 25:8. κατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον ν. 24:6 v.l. (cp. Jos., Ant. 7, 131). ὁ πατρῷος ν. 22:3. τὸν ν. τῶν ἐντολῶν Eph 2:15. Since the context of Ac 23:29 ἐγκαλούμενον περὶ ζητημάτων τοῦ νόμου αὐτῶν points to the intimate connection between belief, cult, and communal solidarity in Judean tradition, the term νόμος is best rendered with an hendiadys: (charged in matters) relating to their belief and custom; cp. ν. ὁ καθʼ ὑμᾶς 18:15. Ro 9:31 (CRhyne, Νόμος Δικαιοσύνης and the meaning of Ro 10:4: CBQ 47, ’85, 486–99).—Abs., without further qualification ὁ ν. Mt 22:36; 23:23; Lk 2:27; J 1:17; Ac 6:13; 7:53; 21:20, 28; Ro 2:15 (τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου the work of the law [=the moral product that the Mosaic code requires] is written in the heart; difft. Diod S 1, 94, 1 ν. ἔγγραπτος, s. 1b, above), 18, 20, 23b, 26; 4:15a, 16; 7:1b, 4–7, 12, 14, 16; 8:3f; 1 Cor 15:56; Gal 3:12f, 17, 19, 21a, 24; 5:3, 14; 1 Ti 1:8 (GRudberg, ConNeot 7, ’42, 15); Hb 7:19 (s. Windisch, Hdb. exc. ad loc.), 28a; 10:1; cp. Js 2:9 (s. 1b above); μετὰ τὸν ν. Hb 7:28b; οἱ ἐν τῷ ν. Ro 3:19; κατὰ τὸν ν. according to the (Mosaic) law (Jos., Ant. 14, 173; 15, 51 al.; Just., D. 10, 1) J 19:7b; Ac 22:12; 23:3; Hb 7:5; 9:22. παρὰ τ. νόμον contrary to the law (Jos., Ant. 17, 151, C. Ap. 2, 219; Ath. 1, 3 παρὰ πάντα ν.) Ac 18:13.—νόμος without the art. in the same sense (on the attempt, beginning w. Origen, In Ep. ad Ro 3:7 ed. Lomm. VI 201, to establish a difference in mng. betw. Paul’s use of ὁ νόμος and νόμος s. B-D-F §258, 2; Rob. 796; Mlt-Turner 177; Grafe [s. 3b below] 7–11) Ro 2:13ab, 17, 23a, * 25a; 3:31ab; 5:13, 20; 7:1a (s. above); Gal 2:19b; 5:23 (JRobb, ET 56, ’45, 279f compares κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος Aristot., Pol. 1284a). δικαίῳ νόμος οὐ κεῖται, ἀνόμοις δὲ … 1 Ti 1:9. Cp. ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος Ro 2:14 (in Pla., Pol. and in Stoic thought the wise person needed no commandment [Stoic. III 519], the bad one did; MPohlenz, Stoa ’48/49 I 133; II 75). Used w. prepositions: ἐκ ν. Ro 4:14; Gal 3:18, 21c (v.l. ἐν ν.); Phil 3:9 (ἐκ νόμου can also mean corresponding to or in conformity with the law: PRev 15, 11 ἐκ τῶν νόμων); cp. ἐκ τοῦ νόμου Ro 10:5. διὰ νόμου Ro 2:12b; 3:20b; 4:13; 7:7b; Gal 2:19a, 21; ἐν ν. (ἐν τῷ ν. Iren. 3, 11, 8 [Harv. II 49, 9]) Ro 2:12a, 23; Gal 3:11, 21c v.l.; 5:4; Phil 3:6. κατὰ νόμον 3:5; Hb 8:4; 10:8 (make an offering κατὰ νόμον as Arrian, Anab. 2, 26, 4; 5, 8, 2); χωρὶς ν. Ro 3:21a; 7:8f; ἄχρι ν. 5:13a. ὑπὸ νόμον 6:14f; 1 Cor 9:20; Gal 3:23; 4:4f, 21a; 5:18 (cp. Just., D. 45, 3 οἱ ὑπὸ τὸν ν.).—Dependent on an anarthrous noun παραβάτης νόμου a law-breaker Ro 2:25b ( 27b w. art.); Js 2:11. ποιητὴς ν. one who keeps the law 4:11d (w. art. Ro 2:13b). τέλος ν. the end of the law Ro 10:4 (RBultmann and HSchlier, Christus des Ges. Ende ’40). πλήρωμα ν. fulfilment of the law 13:10. ν. μετάθεσις a change in the law Hb 7:12. ἔργα ν. Ro 3:20a, 28; 9:32 v.l.; Gal 2:16; 3:2, 5, 10a.—(ὁ) ν. (τοῦ) θεοῦ Ro 7:22, 25a; 8:7 because it was given by God and accords w. his will. Lasting Mt 5:18; Lk 16:17 (cp. Bar 4:1; PsSol 10:4; Philo, Mos. 2, 14; Jos., C. Ap. 2, 277).—Used w. verbs, w. or without the art.: ν. ἔχειν J 19:7a; Ro 2:14 (ApcSed 14:5). πληροῦν ν. fulfill the law Ro 13:8; pass. Gal 5:14 (Mel., P. 42, 291). πληροῦν τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ ν. fulfill the requirement of the law Ro 8:4. φυλάσσειν τὸν ν. observe the law Ac 21:24; Gal 6:13. τὰ δικαιώματα τοῦ ν. φυλάσσειν observe the precepts of the law Ro 2:26; διώκειν ν. δικαιοσύνης 9:31a; πράσσειν ν. 2:25a. ποιεῖν τὸν ν. J 7:19b; Gal 5:3; Ro 2:14b, s. below; τὸν ν. τηρεῖν Js 2:10. τὸν ν. τελεῖν Ro 2:27. φθάνειν εἰς ν. 9:31b. κατὰ ν. Ἰουδαϊσμὸν ζῆν IMg 8:1 v.l. is prob. a textual error (Pearson, Lghtf., Funk, Bihlmeyer, Hilgenfeld; Zahn, Ign. v. Ant. 1873 p. 354, 1 [difft. in Zahn’s edition] all omit νόμον as a gloss and are supported by the Latin versions; s. Hdb. ad loc.). τὰ τοῦ ν. ποιεῖν carry out the requirements of the law Ro 2:14b (ApcSed 14:5; FFlückiger, TZ 8, ’52, 17–42). καταλαλεῖν νόμου, κρίνειν ν. Js 4:11abc. ἐδόθη ν. Gal 3:21a.—Pl. διδοὺς νόμους μου εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν αὐτῶν Hb 8:10; cp. 10:16 (both Jer 38:33).—Of an individual stipulation of the law ὁ νόμος τοῦ ἀνδρός the law insofar as it concerns the husband (Aristot., Fgm. 184 R. νόμοι ἀνδρὸς καὶ γαμετῆς.—SIG 1198, 14 κατὰ τὸν νόμον τῶν ἐρανιστῶν; Num 9:12 ὁ ν. τοῦ πάσχα; Philo, Sobr. 49 ὁ ν. τῆς λέπρας) Ro 7:2b; cp. 7:3 and δέδεται νόμῳ vs. 2a (on the imagery Straub 94f); 1 Cor 7:39 v.l.—The law is personified, as it were (Demosth. 43, 59; Aeschin. 1, 18; Herm. Wr. 12, 4 [the law of punishment]; IMagnMai 92a, 11 ὁ ν. συντάσσει; b, 16 ὁ ν. ἀγορεύει; Jos., Ant. 3, 274) J 7:51; Ro 3:19.

③ a collection of holy writings precious to God’s people, sacred ordinance

ⓐ in the strict sense the law=the Pentateuch, the work of Moses the lawgiver (Diod S 40, 3, 6 προσγέγραπται τοῖς νόμοις ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ὅτι Μωσῆς ἀκούσας τοῦ θεοῦ τάδε λέγει τ. Ἰουδαίοις=at the end of the laws this is appended: this is what Moses heard from God and is telling to the Jews. ὁ διὰ τοῦ ν. μεταξὺ καθαρῶν καὶ ἀκαθάρτων διαστείλας θεός Iren. 3, 12, 7 [Harv. II 60, 3]; cp. Hippol., Ref. 7, 34, 1) τὸ βιβλίον τοῦ νόμου Gal 3:10b (cp. Dt 27:26). Also simply ὁ νόμος (Jos., Bell. 7, 162 ὁ ν. or 2, 229 ὁ ἱερὸς ν. of the holy book in a concrete sense) Mt 12:5 (Num 28:9f is meant); J 8:5; 1 Cor 9:8 (cp. Dt 25:4); 14:34 (cp. Gen 3:16); Gal 4:21b (the story of Abraham); Hb 9:19. ὁ ν. ὁ ὑμέτερος J 8:17 (cp. Jos., Bell. 5, 402; Tat. 40, 1 κατὰ τοὺς ἡμετέρους ν.). ἐν Μωϋσέως νόμῳ γέγραπται 1 Cor 9:9. καθὼς γέγραπται ἐν νόμῳ κυρίου Lk 2:23 (γέγραπται ἐν νόμῳ as Athen. 6, 27, 23c; IMagnMai 52, 35 [III B.C.]; Mel., P. 11, 71; cp. Just., D. 8, 4 τὰ ἐν τῷ ν. γεγραμμένα); cp. vs. 24. ἔγραψεν Μωϋσῆς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ J 1:45 (cp. Cercidas [III B.C.], Fgm. 1, 18f Diehl² [=Coll. Alex. p. 204, 29=Knox p. 196] καὶ τοῦθʼ Ὅμηρος εἶπεν ἐν Ἰλιάδι).—The Sacred Scriptures (OT) referred to as a whole in the phrase ὁ ν. καὶ οἱ προφῆται (Orig., C. Cels. 2, 6, 4; cp. Hippol., Ref. 8, 19, 1) the law (הַתּוֹרָה) and the prophets (הַנְּבִיאִים) Mt 5:17; 7:12; 11:13; 22:40; Lk 16:16; Ac 13:15; 24:14; 28:23; Ro 3:21b; cp. Dg 11:6; J 1:45. τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐν τῷ ν. Μωϋσέως καὶ τοῖς προφήταις καὶ ψαλμοῖς Lk 24:44.

ⓑ In a wider sense=Holy Scripture gener., on the principle that the most authoritative part gives its name to the whole (ὁ ν. ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ Theoph. Ant. 1, 11 [p. 82, 15]): J 10:34 (Ps 81:6); 12:34 (Ps 109:4; Is 9:6; Da 7:14); 15:25 (Ps 34:19; 68:5); 1 Cor 14:21 (Is 28:11f); Ro 3:19 (preceded by a cluster of quotations fr. Psalms and prophets).—Mt 5:18; Lk 10:26; 16:17; J 7:49.—JHänel, Der Schriftbegriff Jesu 1919; OMichel, Pls u. s. Bibel 1929; SWesterholm, Studies in Religion 15, ’86, 327–36.—JMeinhold, Jesus u. das AT 1896; MKähler, Jesus u. das AT² 1896; AKlöpper, Z. Stellung Jesu gegenüber d. Mos. Gesetz, Mt 5:17–48: ZWT 39, 1896, 1–23; EKlostermann, Jesu Stellung z. AT 1904; AvHarnack, Hat Jesus das atl. Gesetz abgeschafft?: Aus Wissenschaft u. Leben II 1911, 225–36, SBBerlAk 1912, 184–207; KBenz, D. Stellung Jesu zum atl. Gesetz 1914; MGoguel, RHPR 7, 1927, 160ff; BBacon, Jesus and the Law: JBL 47, 1928, 203–31; BBranscomb, Jes. and the Law of Moses 1930; WKümmel, Jes. u. d. jüd. Traditionsged.: ZNW 33, ’34, 105–30; JHempel, D. synopt. Jesus u. d. AT: ZAW 56, ’38, 1–34.—Lk-Ac: JJervell, HTR 64, ’71, 21–36.—EGrafe, D. paulin. Lehre vom Gesetz² 1893; HCremer, D. paulin. Rechtfertigungslehre 1896, 84ff; 363ff; FSieffert, D. Entwicklungslinie d. paul. Gesetzeslehre: BWeiss Festschr. 1897, 332–57; WSlaten, The Qualitative Use of νόμος in the Pauline Ep.: AJT 23, 1919, 213ff; HMosbech, Pls’ Laere om Loven: TT 4/3, 1922, 108–37; 177–221; EBurton, ICC, Gal 1921, 443–60; PFeine, Theol. des NT⁶ ’34, 208–15 (lit.); PBenoit, La Loi et la Croix d’après S. Paul (Ro 7:7–8:4): RB 47, ’38, 481–509; CMaurer, D. Gesetzeslehre des Pls ’41; PBläser, D. Gesetz b. Pls ’41; BReicke, JBL 70, ’51, 259–76; GBornkamm, Das Ende d. Gesetzes ’63; HRaisänen, Paul and the Law² ’87; PRichardson/SWesterholm, et al., Law in Religious Communities in the Rom. Period, ’91 (Torah and Nomos); MNobile, La Torà al tempo di Paolo, alcune ri-flessioni: Atti del IV simposio di Tarso su S. Paolo Apostolo, ed. LPadovese ’96, 93–106 (lit. 93f, n. 1).—Dodd 25–41.—B. 1358; 1419; 1421. DELG s.v. νέμω Ic. Schmidt, Syn. I 333–47. M-M. EDNT. TW. Sv.

   1) A Comparison of the Digital Computer and the Brain

   The brain has been compared to a digital computer because the neuron, like a switch or valve, either does or does not complete a circuit. But at that point the similarity ends. The switch in the digital computer is constant in its effect, and its effect is large in proportion to the total output of the machine. The effect produced by the neuron varies with its recovery from [the] refractory phase and with its metabolic state. The number of neurons involved in any action runs into millions so that the influence of any one is negligible.... Any cell in the system can be dispensed with.... The brain is an analogical machine, not digital. Analysis of the integrative activities will probably have to be in statistical terms. (Lashley, quoted in Beach, Hebb, Morgan & Nissen, 1960, p. 539)

   2) Computers Do Not Crunch Numbers, They Manipulate Symbols

   It is essential to realize that a computer is not a mere "number cruncher," or supercalculating arithmetic machine, although this is how computers are commonly regarded by people having no familiarity with artificial intelligence. Computers do not crunch numbers; they manipulate symbols.... Digital computers originally developed with mathematical problems in mind, are in fact general purpose symbol manipulating machines....

   The terms "computer" and "computation" are themselves unfortunate, in view of their misleading arithmetical connotations. The definition of artificial intelligence previously cited-"the study of intelligence as computation"-does not imply that intelligence is really counting. Intelligence may be defined as the ability creatively to manipulate symbols, or process information, given the requirements of the task in hand. (Boden, 1981, pp. 15, 16-17)

   3) Getting Computers to Explain Things to Themselves

   The task is to get computers to explain things to themselves, to ask questions about their experiences so as to cause those explanations to be forthcoming, and to be creative in coming up with explanations that have not been previously available. (Schank, 1986, p. 19)

   4) Some Limits of Artificial Intelligence

   In What Computers Can't Do, written in 1969 (2nd edition, 1972), the main objection to AI was the impossibility of using rules to select only those facts about the real world that were relevant in a given situation. The "Introduction" to the paperback edition of the book, published by Harper & Row in 1979, pointed out further that no one had the slightest idea how to represent the common sense understanding possessed even by a four-year-old. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 102)

   5) The Computer as a Humanizing Influence

   A popular myth says that the invention of the computer diminishes our sense of ourselves, because it shows that rational thought is not special to human beings, but can be carried on by a mere machine. It is a short stop from there to the conclusion that intelligence is mechanical, which many people find to be an affront to all that is most precious and singular about their humanness.

   In fact, the computer, early in its career, was not an instrument of the philistines, but a humanizing influence. It helped to revive an idea that had fallen into disrepute: the idea that the mind is real, that it has an inner structure and a complex organization, and can be understood in scientific terms. For some three decades, until the 1940s, American psychology had lain in the grip of the ice age of behaviorism, which was antimental through and through. During these years, extreme behaviorists banished the study of thought from their agenda. Mind and consciousness, thinking, imagining, planning, solving problems, were dismissed as worthless for anything except speculation. Only the external aspects of behavior, the surface manifestations, were grist for the scientist's mill, because only they could be observed and measured....

   It is one of the surprising gifts of the computer in the history of ideas that it played a part in giving back to psychology what it had lost, which was nothing less than the mind itself. In particular, there was a revival of interest in how the mind represents the world internally to itself, by means of knowledge structures such as ideas, symbols, images, and inner narratives, all of which had been consigned to the realm of mysticism. (Campbell, 1989, p. 10)

   6) The Intentionality of Computers Is Essentially Borrowed, Hence Derivative

   [Our artifacts] only have meaning because we give it to them; their intentionality, like that of smoke signals and writing, is essentially borrowed, hence derivative. To put it bluntly: computers themselves don't mean anything by their tokens (any more than books do)-they only mean what we say they do. Genuine understanding, on the other hand, is intentional "in its own right" and not derivatively from something else. (Haugeland, 1981a, pp. 32-33)

   7) The Possibility of Computer Thought

   he debate over the possibility of computer thought will never be won or lost; it will simply cease to be of interest, like the previous debate over man as a clockwork mechanism. (Bolter, 1984, p. 190)

   8) We Are Getting Better at Building Even Better Computers, an Ever- Escalating Upward Spiral

   t takes us a long time to emotionally digest a new idea. The computer is too big a step, and too recently made, for us to quickly recover our balance and gauge its potential. It's an enormous accelerator, perhaps the greatest one since the plow, twelve thousand years ago. As an intelligence amplifier, it speeds up everything-including itself-and it continually improves because its heart is information or, more plainly, ideas. We can no more calculate its consequences than Babbage could have foreseen antibiotics, the Pill, or space stations.

   According to weak AI, the principle value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion than before. But according to strong AI the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states. And according to strong AI, because the programmed computer has cognitive states, the programs are not mere tools that enable us to test psychological explanations; rather, the programs are themselves the explanations. (Searle, 1981b, p. 353)

    10) Why People Are Smarter Than Computers

   What makes people smarter than machines? They certainly are not quicker or more precise. Yet people are far better at perceiving objects in natural scenes and noting their relations, at understanding language and retrieving contextually appropriate information from memory, at making plans and carrying out contextually appropriate actions, and at a wide range of other natural cognitive tasks. People are also far better at learning to do these things more accurately and fluently through processing experience.

   What is the basis for these differences? One answer, perhaps the classic one we might expect from artificial intelligence, is "software." If we only had the right computer program, the argument goes, we might be able to capture the fluidity and adaptability of human information processing. Certainly this answer is partially correct. There have been great breakthroughs in our understanding of cognition as a result of the development of expressive high-level computer languages and powerful algorithms. However, we do not think that software is the whole story.

   In our view, people are smarter than today's computers because the brain employs a basic computational architecture that is more suited to deal with a central aspect of the natural information processing tasks that people are so good at.... hese tasks generally require the simultaneous consideration of many pieces of information or constraints. Each constraint may be imperfectly specified and ambiguous, yet each can play a potentially decisive role in determining the outcome of processing. (McClelland, Rumelhart & Hinton, 1986, pp. 3-4)

   1) All Human Complex Problem Solving Is Creativity

   Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)

   2) Artificial Intelligence Models of Creative Association

   Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)

   3) Creative Innovation and Social Independence

   There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)

   4) Ego Strength and Emotional Stability among Creative Geniuses

   he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)

   5) Its Mundane Character

   he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)

   6) Mozart's Musical Ideas Came to Him in Polished Form

   From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)

   7) Scientific Theories and Works of Art Alike Originate in Fantasy

   Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)

   8) Self- Esteem and Creative Expression

   The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)

   9) Stages in Creative Problem- Solving

   In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)

    10) The Bisociative Pattern of the Creative Synthesis

   he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)

    11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with Disorder

   Even to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)

    12) The Inner Life of the Creative Process

   New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)

    13) The Problem of What Impels the Creative Person

   [P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....

   Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)

    14) Theories of Creative Thinking

   A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....

   Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)